Psychological and physiological characteristics of a proposed object-referral/self-referral continuum of self-awareness

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Abstract

This research extends and confirms recent brainwave findings that distinguished an individual’s sense-of-self along an Object-referral/Self-referral Continuum of self-awareness. Subjects were interviewed and were given tests measuring inner/outer orientation, moral reasoning, anxiety, and personality. Scores on the psychological tests were factor analyzed. The first unrotated PCA component of the test scores yielded a “Consciousness Factor,” analogous to the intelligence “g” factor, which accounted for over half of the variance among groups. Analysis of unstructured interviews of these subjects revealed fundamentally different descriptions of self-awareness. Individuals who described themselves in terms of concrete cognitive and behavioral processes (predominantly Object-referral mode) exhibited lower Consciousness Factor scores, lower frontal EEG coherence, lower alpha and higher gamma power during tasks, and less efficient cortical preparatory responses (contingent negative variation). In contrast, individuals who described themselves in terms of an abstract, independent sense-of-self underlying thought, feeling and action (predominantly Self-referral mode) exhibited higher Consciousness Factor scores, higher frontal coherence, higher alpha and lower gamma power during tasks, and more efficient cortical responses. These data suggest that definable states of brain activity and subjective experiences exist, in addition to waking, sleeping and dreaming, that may be operationally defined by psychological and physiological measures along a continuum of Object-referral/Self-referral Continuum of self-awareness.

Introduction

Consciousness research employs a variety of techniques and approaches to explore the nature of human experience. Neural imaging techniques, including EEG, MEG, PET, and fMRI, have been used to characterize different mental processes and internal states including attention (Posner, Petersen, Fox, & Raichle, 1988; Posner & Raichle, 1998), word generation (Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintun, & Raichle, 1988; Snyder, Abdullaev, Posner, & Raichle, 1995), emotional states (Davidson, 2002; Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschke, & Putnam, 2002; Gur et al., 2002), and moral reasoning (Chayer & Freedman, 2001; Moll et al., 2002; Moll, Eslinger, & Oliveira-Souza, 2001). Patterns of brain functioning have also provided insight into the development of psychological processes. For instance, Piagetian cognitive stages in children are correlated with a sequence of bursts in brain volume (Epstein, 1974; Epstein, 1980; Thatcher, 1992) and increased density in frontal, hippocampal, cerebellum and basal ganglia cortices (Herschkowitz, Kagan, & Zilles, 1997).

Patterns of brain functioning have even helped delineate different descriptions of self-awareness, such as: ownership (in respect to perceptions and judgments), agency (in respect to actions and thoughts), cognitive unity (in respect to beliefs and attitudes) and reflective self-awareness awareness of one’s physical characteristics, behavior, personality, emotional states, or imagery (Marshall & Fink, 2001; Vogeley, Kurthen, Falkai, & Maier, 1999). Different levels of reflective self-awareness have been associated with activation across predominately midline frontal-parietal structures. For instance, stories containing either 1st or 3rd person pronouns were found to activate the precuneus in a PET study (Ruby & Decety, 2001), and anterior cingulate in a fMRI study (Vogeley et al., 2001). The level of abstractness/concreteness of 1st person reflection (personality traits versus physical traits) activated precuneus and angular gyrus, respectively (Kjaer et al., 2001). ‘Perspectivity,’ bodily processes contributing to ones point of view, is also reported to activate medial parietal cortices including the precuneus and angular gyrus (Taylor, 2001). Action planning also activates these structures (Ruby, Sirigu, & Decety, 2002). Other studies have reported medial frontal activation during self-referential judgments of pictures (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001) and in self-referential judgments of trait adjectives (Kelley, Macrae, Wyland, Caglar, & Inati, 2002). A meta-analysis of fMRI and PET studies also reported elevated medial parietal and prefrontal activation during “baseline” resting conditions, including simple visual fixation or eyes-closed rest, compared to active task conditions (Raichle et al., 2001). The striking similarity between neural networks associated with states of reflective self-awareness and resting baseline suggests that there are distinct brain states associated with more outward, object- and task-oriented modes of processing versus more inward, self-oriented modes of processing.

This distinction between external versus internal modes of awareness is a predominant theme in cognitive development. At each stage of development, a more stable and unified internal frame of reference or dominant focus of awareness is established, providing an increasingly comprehensive context within which information of external objects and events is processed and given meaning (Alexander et al., 1990; Kegan, 1983; Wilber, 2000).

The progressive primacy of more inner abstract levels of self-awareness with development has been characterized by Alexander et al. (1990) and Kegan (1983) as a process of “de-embedding” from a more expressed level to a more abstract level of self-awareness. (See Alexander et al., 1990 for a detailed discussion of this process). For instance, Piaget’s stages of cognitive development can be understood as the progressive de-embedding of an individual’s sense-of-self from sensory, motor, and cognitive processes (Alexander et al., 1990). Thus, one could have a behavioral-centered self in which the person identifies with sensorimotor behavior: “I like to forge my own way;” or “I like to go out and experiment with new ideas.” As one de-embeds from behavior, one could have a more cognitive-centered self in which the person identifies with mental objects and ongoing mentation: “I’m open to new experiences.” In turn, one could become more affect-centered, in which one identifies more with feelings and interrelations with others and the environment: “I care deeply for other people;” or “I’m happy, caring, helpful. I like to help other people. This progressive de-embedding of self-awareness from mental contents and processes is a natural process that is shaped by ongoing experience (Alexander et al., 1990; Travis, Tecce, & Durchholz, 2001).

This developmental process of de-embedding raises a question: Can one’s experience of sense-of-self be de-embedded from all mental processing? If so, then awareness would experience awareness, without the usual mental content and processing associated with daily experience.

The prevailing Western view is that an individual cannot be aware without being aware of something (James, 1962). In contrast, the subjective traditions of the East—the Vedic tradition of India (Maharishi, 1969), and the Buddhist traditions of China (Chung-Yuan, 1969) and Japan (Reps, 1955)—include formalized meditation techniques predicted to lead to the direct experience of a foundational state of self-awareness devoid of mental content. For instance, the Maitri Upanishad (Maitri Upanishad 6:19, in Upanishads, 1953) states:

When a wise man has withdrawn his mind from all things without, and when his spirit of life has peacefully left inner sensations, let him rest in peace, free from the movements of will and desire….. Let the spirit of life surrender itself into what is called turya, the fourth condition of consciousness. For it has been said: There is something beyond our mind, which abides in silence within our mind. It is the supreme mystery beyond thought. Let one’s mind… rest upon that and not rest on anything else.

Over the past 40 years, a growing body of research suggests a putative fourth state of consciousness, distinct from waking, dreaming, and sleeping, can be systematically experienced and documented with western scientific experimentation. Physiological patterns distinguish individuals who report a state of awareness, during Transcendental Meditation (TM) practice, where the self is only aware of itself, devoid of all thoughts, feelings and perceptions (Badawi, Wallace, Orme-Johnson, & Rouzere, 1984; Farrow & Hebert, 1982; Travis & Wallace, 1997). This state, has been called “pure, self-referral consciousness” (Maharishi, 1969) to distinguish it from “object-referral consciousness” in which we experience self-awareness along with inner thoughts and feelings and/or outer objects. First-person reports of pure, self-referral consciousness define a state of awareness in which self-awareness is intact, yet there is no ‘sense’ of time, space, or one’s body (Travis & Pearson, 2000).

Repeated experience of the fourth state of pure, self-referral consciousness alternated with customary waking activity gives rise to a new integrated brain state in which pure, self-referral consciousness or awareness co-exists across the 24 h of waking, dreaming and sleeping consciousness (Maharishi, 1969). In this new integrated state, pure self-referral consciousness is experienced as a foundational state that gives rise to ongoing experience during waking, sleeping and dreaming (Maharishi, 1969). It is analogous to the vastness of the ocean not be lost with each rising wave of daily life.

In the past decade, research has investigated individuals reporting this experience of the integration of pure, self-referral consciousness with sleeping and waking. Mason et al. (1997) reported that 11 individuals reporting this integrated experience exhibited similar levels of delta activity during slow wave sleep compared to 11 non-meditating controls, but elevated levels of theta and alpha EEG (Mason et al., 1997). It is noteworthy that the co-existence of the EEG patterns of deep sleep (delta) and meditation (theta and alpha) was associated with the subjective experience of co-existence of deep sleep along with the continued inner awareness. In a second study, EEG and ERP patterns during eyes-open computer tasks also distinguished individuals who report this integrated state (Travis, Tecce, Arenander, & Wallace, 2002). The EEG and ERP patterns distinguishing these subjects are summarized in detail below because these same subjects participated in the research reported in this paper. An understanding of their brainwave patterns may facilitate the interpretation of the 1st and 3rd person data reported in this paper.

EEG and ERP patterns were compared across three groups of individuals distinguished by their self-reported experience of the integration of pure self-referral awareness with waking and sleeping. These three groups also differed on scores of two tests of transcendental experiences—Hood’s M-Scale (Hood & Ralph, 1975) and Baruss’s test of Material/Transcendental Worldview (Baruss & Moore, 1992), and in years practice of TM: a Non-TM group, a Short-term group (7.2 years. TM practice), and a Long-term group (24.3 years TM practice).

EEG patterns were recorded during two contingent negative variation (CNV) tasks in these three groups. Both tasks contained a pair of stimuli 1.5 s apart. CNV is the rise in the EEG baseline between the two stimuli (Walter, Cooper, Aldridge, McCallum, & Winter, 1964). CNV amplitude 200 ms before the expected stimulus, called the late CNV, reflects proactive preparatory processes, including mobilization of motor (Brunia, 1993; van Boxtel & Brunia, 1994) perceptual, cognitive, and attention resources (Tecce & Cattanach, 1993).

The first task was a simple CNV task—asterisk/ tone/ button-press to stop the tone. The second task was a choice CNV task—two numbers were sequentially presented, 1.5 s apart. Subjects responded with a left/right button press to indicate which number was larger. Three brainwave measures calculated during the choice CNV trials distinguished individuals who reported the integration of pure self-referral awareness with waking and sleeping. These measures were: (1) higher broadband frontal EEG coherence, (2) higher alpha and lower gamma power, and (3) a better match of the timing and magnitude of CNV with task demands.

Broadband frontal task EEG coherence was highest in the Long-term group (Travis et al., 2002). The Non-TM group had lowest task coherence, and the Short-Term group exhibited intermediate values of coherence. The frontal cortices, which are reciprocally connected with nearly all other cortical, subcortical, and brainstem structures (Fuster, 1993), are important circuits for emotion regulation (Davidson, 2002), moral reasoning (Moll et al., 2002; Moll et al., 2001), decision making and planning (Fuster, 1993, Fuster, 2000) and self-concept (Ben Shalom, 2000; Vogeley et al., 1999). Broadband coherence, in contrast to narrow band coherence such as theta or alpha, may reflect large-scale cortical integration thought necessary for the unity of subjective experience (Varela, Lachaux, Rodriguez, & Martinerie, 2001). Broadband frontal coherence observed in subjects reporting this integrate state may characterize the large-scale neural integration necessary to support the coexistence of pure, self-referral consciousness with waking and sleeping experience.

The pattern of peak power estimates during tasks also discriminated these subjects (Travis et al., 2002). Alpha (8–10 Hz) EEG can be associated with long-range, top-down processes, while gamma (25–55 Hz) EEG is associated with local, bottom-up, sensory processing (von Stein & Sarnthein, 2000). During tasks, the Long-term group had higher alpha power and lower gamma power than the other two groups. This high alpha/gamma ratio in Long-term TM subjects suggests that they may process information differently: Inner, self-awareness may play a greater role in cognitive processing.

The CNV patterns in the three groups support the proposition that the Long-term subjects processed tasks differently. CNV in the Long-term group better suited the task demands.

In the Long-term group, late CNV was higher during simple trials, when subjects knew the correct response before the second stimulus. In the simple trials, it would be appropriate to initiate preparatory responses before the second stimulus. In contrast, the Long-term group’s CNV was lower during choice trials, when they had not yet seen the second number and so did not have enough information to decide whether a left or right response were appropriate. The reverse pattern was observed in the Non-TM group. In the choice trials, the Non-TM subjects activated brain response processes before they had sufficient information to determine the correct response, i.e., before they saw the second number.

Frontal and central cortical areas participate in generating the CNV waveform (Tecce & Cattanach, 1993). Appropriate timing of CNV activation suggests more appropriate timing of frontal executive processes in the Long-term TM subjects. This CNV finding complements the finding of higher levels of frontal EEG coherence during tasks in these subjects. Thus, frontal areas, whose functioning are critical for generating levels of self-awareness (Hobson & Pace-Schott, 2002; Vogeley et al., 1999) appear to function differently in these three groups. As a consequence, one might expect significant differences in the inner experience of sense-of-self in the Long-term TM subjects.

The current study extends these earlier brainwave findings by exploring the details of the inner subjective experience of these subjects through two approaches—an unstructured interview and a battery of standard psychological tests. The 1st person phenomenological reports and psychological tests used in this research explore possible dimensions of inner experience to complement the previously reported brain measures. Taken together, the qualitative and quantitative measures are used to delineate a Object referral/Self-referral Continuum of self-awareness that links ordinary descriptions of identity in which the outer, objective worldview predominates in one’s sense-of-self, with so-called experience of higher states of consciousness, in which pure, self-referral consciousness is the predominant aspect of experience (Alexander et al., 1990).

Section snippets

Experiment 1: Exploring inner experience through unstructured interviews

This experiment explores 1st person, phenomenological reports of self-awareness as revealed in unstructured interviews and analyzed using Atlas-ti content analysis software. We hypothesize that the analysis will yield dimensions of experience that distinguish the three groups.

Experiment 2: Exploring inner experience through psychological tests

This second experiment used standardized tests of psychological health to further investigate the nature of self-awareness in these subjects.

General discussion

These three groups of subjects showed significant differences on: 1st person descriptions of self-awareness, Consciousness-Factor scores, and brain waves patterns during tasks (from our previous work). These three measures may define a range of sense-of-self along an Object-referral/Self-referral Continuum (see Fig. 1). The two boxes on the right of Fig. 1 present the supercode from the phenomenological first person reports, and the psychological (Consciousness Factor) and physiological

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